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Real divergences in economic performances that emerge between countries 
belonging to the Eurozone make it necessary to define an economic policy 
oriented towards a re-industrialization of some regions in Europe. In a world 
characterized by irreversibility of investment and imperfection of market infor-
mation, supply-side reforms should consist in establishing a framework aimed 
at supporting both competition and cooperation between the various players of 
innovation, and thus allowing firm strategies to be successful. This requires 
reconsidering both national and European policies that are growth-enhancing, 
that is, industrial policy, competition policy, labour policy, regional policy, and 
banking policy. However, any change in the industrial landscape in Europe will 
only be possible if a new macroeconomic policy prevents the inappropriate 
destruction of productive capacities.
1. A dangerous problem
There is now a new and very dangerous problem in Europe:  the 
increasing real divergence between European countries, particu-
larly between France and Germany both in terms of industry 
development and in terms of trade balance, which feeds the obses-
sion of competitiveness. 
As a matter of fact, unit labour costs have increased in France 
relatively to what happened in Germany. This is a signal of an 
increasing competitiveness gap, during the last decade. But it 
would be a mistake to only focus on costs and prices while the 
main difference between the two countries lies in the nature of 
industrial organisation.
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Germany is characterised by a dense and stable group of 
medium-sized firms (16,000 firms with between 500 and 5,000 
employees). Production segments are outsourced to low-cost coun-
tries with highly qualified employees, so that real wage costs 
(taking into account the labour costs of countries in Eastern 
Europe) are about 20% lower than those of other countries in the 
euro area. 
In France, large firms that are specialised in a specific area – 
aeronautics, energy, environment, luxury goods, etc. – perform 
exceptionally well on global markets. However, when these firms 
relocate some part of their business, it is to less-developed coun-
tries most often characterised by low wages and low skills. On the 
other hand, there are too few medium-sized firms (4,000 firms 
between 500 and 5,000 employees), and successful SMEs are 
rapidly sold and acquired by large firms, when they should instead 
be allowed to grow without losing their identity. The consequence 
is that firms belonging to large segments of industry are more 
sensitive to price competition.
During the 1990s, in manufacturing sector, the total firm turn-
over (entry plus exit rates) was about 3% in Germany, while it was 
around 11% in France. Moreover, firm exit outpaced firm entry in 
France, while Germany experienced a more balanced pattern. 
Entry and exit rates are positively correlated in Germany, while 
they are negatively correlated in France. This can be interpreted as 
meaning that the creative destruction process is predominant in 
Germany, while sector profit shock is predominant in France. 
However, another interpretation is possible: that in Germany 
market structures are relatively stabilised and investment behav-
iours are relatively well co-ordinated, while more turbulences 
persist in France, revealing a weaker degree of co-ordination within 
industries which affect firms’ performance.
Given this gap, and according to the actual consensus, supply 
or structural reforms would be the only way to re-establish growth 
and full employment, and to favour real convergence among the 
European countries. These reforms would consist in promoting 
competition to diminish economic rents on both the goods and 
the labour markets. In France for example, dismantle the 
monopoly power of taxis aimed at overcoming the shortage of 
supply should allow increasing competition and reducing prices. 
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Opening on Sunday local stores and more generally introducing 
less rigidity in labour times would favour employment and 
growth. Indeed, although the reduction of abnormal economic 
rents is well grounded in several instances, dismantling entry 
barriers is not the sole means neither a simple means to promote 
industrial development.
2. Real coordination issues
Competition plays a central role in the co-ordination process, as 
it determines the way in which the relevant market information is 
being made available step-by-step, so that the required adjust-
ments in productive capacity can actually take place. 
But, rather than conceiving competition as a state of affairs, it is 
more appropriate to conceive it as a process, whereby new products 
are being introduced onto the markets, and incumbents are being 
challenged by potential and actual new players. Competition helps 
to make innovation process viable and to obtain the productivity 
gains deriving from it. In this light, it is not only aimed at equal-
ising supply and demand in a given market and technological 
environment, but also has to adapt both structure and technology 
to the fresh opportunities created by expanding markets.
This is where argument about the real nature of the information 
process comes to rescue. Innovation requires both competitive and 
complementary investments. On the one hand, investment by a 
single firm will be profitable provided, first, that the volume of 
investment by rival does not exceed a critical threshold, and, 
secondly, that the volume of complementary investments reaches a 
minimum level. On the other hand, investments decisions are 
taken by entrepreneurs on the basis of expectations whose relia-
bility depends on their being grounded on adequate market 
information that is not immediately available. As a consequence, 
entrepreneurs will have access to the market information they 
require only if there exists a variety of restraints to which their 
freedom of action is subject. These restraints feature as imperfec-
tions or frictions, which are in the nature of the competitive system.
In this context, policies to ameliorate industry performance 
should be aimed at improving market information to firms, 
creating a more stable environment, and should then help indus-
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tries to converge towards a stable and efficient market structure. 
Obviously, governments do not have more accurate information 
than firms do about markets and technologies. But they have the 
devices that help firms to access information about market condi-
tions, and thus in their efforts to innovate and grow. 
3. Industrial policy
From this perspective, industrial policy, rather than being 
targeted at promoting specific sectors or technology, must be an 
array of horizontal interventions that concern the relations 
between firms, between firms and their employees, between firms 
and financial intermediaries, or between firms and public research 
institutions. This final option is preferable to any other since such 
intervention does not shield any particular firm or sector, but 
rather increases the quality of incentives, which are strongly 
dependent on conditions of co-ordination. Subsidies must not be 
devoted at supporting national champions or high tech sectors per 
se, but at encouraging cooperation between firms, including, of 
course, the firms that compete with each other. 
Hence industrial policies should be horizontal. But instead of 
replicating or re-establishing the conditions of full (perfect) 
competition as required by those calling for supply-side reforms, 
they should be aimed at validating some restraints or monopolist 
practices that allow firms acquiring market information.
In other words, competition policy must consider the distor-
tions that the growth process necessarily carries in and the 
necessity of having temporary market imperfections. Instead of 
targeting a mythic state of perfect competition, it must be aimed at 
enforcing the viability of the innovation process.
Connexions among firms can then be viewed as a necessary 
aspect of the production and the dissemination of knowledge in a 
market economy. In this perspective it is surely incorrect to call 
them imperfections: Schumpeter coined them as the natural 
features of an economic process driven by creative destruction. 
Therefore policy-makers face a dilemma. On the one hand, 
contrived arrangements help firms to invest and innovate, thereby 
contributing to economic growth. On the other hand, it is some-
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times in the nature of these arrangements to shelter inefficiency or 
extract undue profits. But it is another story to argue that all imper-
fections are against the public interest per se. It is then necessary to 
provide policy makers with guidelines by specifying the circum-
stances in which these practices may or may not justified. 
4. Labour market policy
The prevailing view in the literature and in most political circles 
is that the possibility of hiring and firing freely, and of offering 
wages at a freely-chosen level, is an incentive to invest and hence 
favours innovation and growth.
Yet the fundamental aspect of a thorough process of innovation 
is the creation of skills. It results from job tenure and, thereby, 
favours on-the-job training. Employment protection affects not 
only employment but also human capital accumulation, and 
hence productivity and welfare. Then, labour market policies, far 
from being oriented to the dismantlement of the welfare state, 
should promote labour market organisation and forms of 
bargaining between employers and employees that help with 
adjustment to technological and market changes. In France, it 
would be more appropriate to reinforce bargaining procedures 
between employers and employees, and to revise the working of 
internal labour markets rather than suppress them.
Therefore, the effect of employment security regulation and of 
the partial reforms recently carried out, which extend to the use of 
temporary contracts for newly-hired workers leaving employment 
protection unchanged for permanent workers, and hence make the 
labour market more flexible, have only favoured a segmentation of 
this market and the appearance of a new category of workers, 
namely the ‘short-term’ workers. This segmentation might even be 
an obstacle to workers’ mobility and growth by preventing volun-
tary quits from ‘solid’ jobs.
5. Banking policy
Banking policy must be considered in relation to the problem of 
providing firms facing innovation processes with the required 
amount of liquidity, and the right distribution of this liquidity at 
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the right moment. In this light, financial institutions are impor-
tant, not so much because they are associated with incentives 
schemes that are more or less appropriate in the sense of deter-
mining a higher or lower saving rate, a better or a worse resource 
allocation, but as for the capacity to smooth the fluctuations of 
outcome. Therefore the debate about the role and the functions of 
banks appears as essential. 
When liquidity is needed to cover sunk costs associated with 
research and development investments, what is at stake is the 
ability of financial intermediaries to support firms along this path. 
As a matter of fact, relationship-banks offer continuation – lending 
at more favourable terms than transaction banks to innovative 
firms. This is why the regulation of the banking system is neces-
sary. The separation between credit banks (or relationship-banks) 
and investment banks as proposed by European commission aims 
at ensuring that credit bank activities are not unduly influenced by 
a short-term oriented strategy associated with risky investment 
bank activities.
6. Regional policy
It goes without saying that industrial policies have a territorial 
dimension insofar as there are local learning processes. But, there is 
no evidence that local or regional governments are better informed 
than the national government, have a higher degree of compe-
tence, or are less easily captured by lobbyists. Competition between 
regional governments may prove inefficient if its main conse-
quence is to promote the performance of a small number of regions 
at the detriment of all others. Such inequalities would be detri-
mental to real convergence and affect negatively global efficiency. 
The conjecture can be made that the smaller the regions, the 
more wasteful competition between them will be. This might be so 
because small regions are more inclined to compete with each 
other by proposing generic advantages such as tax reductions or 
set-up subsidies, which reduce the sunk costs that firms have to 
bear and make setting-up more instable. Larger regions, on the 
other hand, would be more inclined to promote cooperation 
between firms within and outside its territory, and to pay subsidies 
aimed at sustaining large public programmes such as environ-
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mental programmes. The issues to deal with are to build on critical 
mass, to allow diversification or differentiation among regions, 
and most of all, to facilitate adjustments to changes affecting tech-
nologies and preferences.
Clusters as well as technological competencies are the result of 
innovation rather than a precondition of it. Again, policy-makers 
face a dilemma, which concerns both the appropriate level of deci-
sion-making and the relevant geographical area of public 
intervention. 
7. The European challenge
The main objective of any policy in Europe should be to re-
establish the conditions of a convergence in real terms, which 
means re-establishing a balanced trade between the large European 
countries, and, thus, re-industrialising some parts of the euro-zone. 
This requires reconsidering both national and European policies 
that are growth-enhancing, that is, competition policy, labour 
policy, regional policy, but also industrial policy stricto sensu.
First of all, it would be worthwhile to abandon the idea that 
supply-side reforms making the factor markets – among which the 
labour market – more flexible in all countries would reinforce the 
competitiveness of each without damaging global demand and 
growth at the European level. Efforts by governments to reduce the 
cost of labour can only be bounded, for the target cannot be to 
reach a cost of labour similar to that of, say, Eastern European 
countries. More flexibility in the factor market may be worthwhile 
only when backed by strong public support. For example, it has 
been shown that liberalization in the energy markets has led to an 
upsurge in innovation in renewable energy only when strong poli-
cies supporting green innovation are being implemented. In the 
same vein, the search for increased flexibility in the labour market 
encouraging professional mobility should be accompanied by 
strong support to lifelong learning, among other things. More than 
securing employment, public policies should secure employability.     
Therefore, in contrast with the common belief that competition 
demands no or low state intervention, industrial policy and 
competition policy might appear as complements in favouring 
innovation. Supply-side reforms should consist in establishing a 
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policy framework aimed at supporting both competition and coop-
eration between the various players of innovation processes. This is 
largely the case in Germany, but not in France and not at the Euro-
pean level. Therefore, other countries in Europe should take 
advantage of the German experience and revisit their national 
policies. At the same time, a new European initiative should take 
the form of large public programmes defined at appropriate 
geographic levels, that is, levels that permit avoiding the destruc-
tive competition between regions or countries, typically 
technological programmes in transversal fields such as energy 
production and distribution, transportation, health-related indus-
tries such as the pharmaceutical industry. 
The main reason for developing such programmes is that they 
qualify as general purpose technologies, rather than being sector 
specific both in terms of activities, firms and countries, and they 
aim at improving market information for firms, creating a more 
stable environment, making it credible and relevant for these firms 
to invest. 
It remains that changes in the industrial landscape in Europe 
will only be possible if a new macroeconomic policy is under way. 
Generalised austerity is now destroying large segments of the Euro-
pean industry. Although fiscal consolidation is a necessary part of 
a rebalancing strategy, it should be progressive, going hand to 
hand with structural reforms that correspond to a coherent variety 
of capitalism.
